It Can't Be All Bad, Can It?

Like art, humor is one of those elusive concepts—impossible to define, but easy to recognize. The same person who laughs at a line in Shakespeare, may find an episode of Friends just as funny. Obviously, what people find humorous is too broad and too varied for a single, neat definition. However, this does not mean a person must simply accept a vague statement like “humor is that which makes one laugh,” and be done with it. Though no one explanation may account for every aspect, there are still some theories which are excellent starting points for anyone wishing to better understand the mechanisms of humor.

First on the list of critical thinkers is Aristotle and his definition of comedy as “an imitation of people who are worse than the average.” (14). His brand of humor is what the text describes as “derisive,” because it is amusement at the inferiority of others (14). Moving to another, Thomas Hobbes’ states, “…the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves” (20). Though it is a bit different, it still drives at the same idea Aristotle presented: something is funny because it mocks the inferior, an action which accordingly means those who are laughing are presuming themselves superior. Different from the previous two, the last one to look at is Decartes who surmises that “there is always some little element of hatred, or at least of wonder” accompanying laughter (23). In this interpretation, laughter is never the product of pure delight, but rather is always the fusion of joy with surprise (wonder), or some type of mild hatred.

Undeniably, the plausibility of all these hypothesis have truth to them, successfully providing workable theories of humor. As Aristotle stated, much of what people find funny is behavior which comes from moments of low intelligence. It’s why a whole cartoon is dedicated to a coyote’s many ill-conceived plots at capturing a roadrunner. Also, Hobbes’ theory shows why people still laugh at “dumb blonde” jokes, evidently feeling themselves superior. Consequently, those jokes (as well racial or religious ones) also show Descartes to be true, proving there must be some level of hatred (said to be usually mild), for people to mock these things. Nevertheless, even though all three of these particular assumptions are well enough, there is still a glaring problem.

The inferiority of others, our own superiority, hatred—negativity permeates all three, coloring humor in a rather unpleasant light. That is why despite all their truth, for me, these theories (or at least two out of three) still fail. I can recognize and accept the reality that much of what is funny comes at a cost to others, but such is not always the case. The typical “knock knock” joke does not concern itself with issues of the superior and inferior or their hatred. Here is where Descartes’ component of wonder becomes important. If forced to choose, his theory would be the best, because one can argue that humor is just as much a product of the unexpected, and laughter comes when people are not ready for the answer they receive. Indeed, to examine wonder in its relation to humor is a more positive approach, and provides some peace for me who rather believe the fun of humor is not entirely based in spiteful reasons.

Morreall, John. The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.